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Abstract—Personalized recommendation has demonstrated its effectiveness in improving the problem of information overload on the
Internet. However, evidences show that due to the concerns of personal privacy, users’ reluctance to disclose their personal
information has become a major barrier for the development of personalized recommendation. In this paper, we propose to generate a
group of fake preference profiles, so as to cover up the user sensitive subjects, and thus protect user personal privacy in personalized
recommendation. First, we present a client-based framework for user privacy protection, which requires not only no change to existing
recommendation algorithms, but also no compromise to the recommendation accuracy. Second, based on the framework, we introduce
a privacy protection model, which formulates the two requirements that ideal fake preference profiles should satisfy: (1) the similarity of
feature distribution, which measures the effectiveness of fake preference profiles to hide a genuine user preference profile; and (2) the
exposure degree of sensitive subjects, which measures the effectiveness of fake preference profiles to cover up the sensitive subjects.
Finally, based on a subject repository of product classification, we present an implementation algorithm to well meet the privacy
protection model. Both theoretical analysis and experimental evaluation demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach.
Index Terms—Personalized Recommendation, Personal Privacy, Sensitive Subject, Feature Distribution
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1 INTRODUCTION
THE rapid development of the Internet results in theexplosive growth of information quantity, leading to the
serious problem of information overload, and thus greatly
reducing the using efficiency of information. Personalized
recommendation, which can guide users to discover the
information that they really need by means of the record
analysis of user personal preferences, is considered to one
of the most effective tools to solve the problem of infor-
mation overload [?], [?], [?]. Presently, personalized recom-
mendation has achieved great success in many application
fields (typically, e-commerce). Almost all the large-scale e-
commerce sites (such as Amazon and Jingdong) have intro-
duced personalized recommendation to a variable extent.
In general, a complete personalized recommendation
system consists of three parts [?], [?], i.e., (1) a behavior
record component that collects user’s personal information,
(2) a preference analysis component that analyzes user
personal preferences, and (3) a recommendation algorithm
component. In a personalized recommendation system, the
recommendation algorithm is the core component, which
aims to find out the products that best meet user prefer-
ences from a database of products. Presently, there exist
many kinds of recommendation algorithms, typically in-
cluding collaborative filtering [?], [?], [?], content-based rec-
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ommendation [?], [?], and network-based recommendation
[?], [?]. In general, the better the accuracy of personalized
recommendation, the more users’ personal information a
recommendation algorithm needs to master. However, the
collection and analysis of users’ personal information will
lead to users’ concerns on personal privacy, resulting in
negative impacts on the development of personalized rec-
ommendation: it not only reduces the willingness of users
to use the service of personalized recommendation, but also
makes users no longer willing to supply accurate personal
information, thereby, reducing the accuracy of personalized
recommendation. Therefore, personalized recommendation
would lose the confidence and support of the users, if it
cannot strengthen the protection of users’ personal priva-
cy. In fact, user privacy concerns have become one major
barrier for the development and application of personalized
recommendation, as pointed out in [?], [?], [?].
1.1 Motivations
In order to protect personal privacy in personalized recom-
mendation, many approaches have been proposed, specif-
ically including: data obfuscation, data transformation,
anonymization etc. (1) The basic idea of data obfuscation
techniques is to use fake or general data to obfuscate the
data related to the sensitive preferences contained in users’
preference profiles [?], [?], [?]. This kind of techniques might
lead to poor recommendation accuracy due to its change
to user preference profiles. (2) In data transformation tech-
niques, users’ personal data need to be transformed (e.g.,
using noise addition or data perturbation) [?], [?], [?], before
being used for personalized recommendation. Generally,
this kind of techniques can only be applied to collaborative
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filtering algorithms. Moreover, it has been demonstrated
that effective data transformation would not lead to a neg-
ative impact on the accuracy of collaborative filtering rec-
ommendation. However, since the recommendation results
are fully visible to the untrusted server-side, it is possible
for an attacker on the server-side to guess the genuine user
preferences conversely by analyzing the recommendation
results, thus, leading to the disclosure of personal privacy.
(3) Anonymization has been widely applied to personal
privacy protection [?], [?], which allows users to use a sys-
tem without the need to expose their identity information.
However, as pointed out in [?], [?], it is very necessary to
confirm the true identity for each user in a recommendation
system. Therefore, this kind of techniques cannot satisfy
the requirement of the practical application of personalized
recommendation.
Based on the above, we conclude that to supply an effec-
tive personalized recommendation service, it is required for
a privacy protection approach to satisfy the following three
requirements. (1) Ensuring the security of user sensitive
preferences (i.e., the preference information that users are
not willing to expose). Specifically, it should be difficult for
an attacker not only to identify the user sensitive preferences
from users’ personal behavior (or data), but also to guess the
user sensitive preferences conversely through analyzing the
results returned from the recommendation algorithm. The
former can be achieved by both data obfuscation and data
transformation. However, the latter cannot be achieved by
data transformation since it ensures the accuracy of recom-
mendation. (2) Ensuring the accuracy of the user final rec-
ommendation results, i.e., the recommendation results that
users receive finally should be as consistent as possible (or
the same), before and after the privacy protection approach
is introduced. (3) Ensuring the efficiency of personalized
recommendation, i.e., the introduction of privacy protection
should not lead to a serious effect on the execution efficiency
of a personalized recommendation service.
1.2 Contributions
In this paper, we aim to propose an effective approach
to protect user’s personal privacy in personalized recom-
mendation. The approach should address all the problems
mentioned above, i.e., under the precondition of not chang-
ing existing recommendation algorithms, it can not only
effectively prevent the untrusted server-side from identi-
fying the user sensitive preferences from personal data or
recommendation results, but also ensure the accuracy of
recommendation results and the efficiency of a personalized
recommendation service. The basic idea of the approach is
to construct a group of fake preference profiles, so as to
cover up the user sensitive subjects, and thus to protect user
personal privacy. Specifically, the contributions of this paper
are threefold.
First, we present a client-based system framework to
protect user sensitive preferences in personalized recom-
mendation. Under the system framework, we move the
behavior record component to a trusted client, making that
user preference profiles would be generated in the trusted
client. Then, the client constructs a group of fake preference
profiles, and submits them together with the genuine user
preference profile to the server-side for personalized rec-
ommendation. Thus, the recommendation results from the
server-side would be no longer accurate (since including
those corresponding to the fake profiles), which makes it
difficult for an attacker to identify the user’s sensitive pref-
erences from the recommendation results. Finally, the client
discards all the recommendation results that correspond to
the fake preference profiles, so only the recommendation
result that corresponds to the genuine preference profile is
returned to the user, consequently, ensuring the accuracy of
personalized recommendation.
Second, based on the system framework, the paper
introduces a privacy model for user sensitive preference
protection. The model formulates the requirements that the
fake preference profiles should satisfy so as to protect the
sensitive preferences effectively, i.e., fake profiles should
have similar features with the genuine profile, and irrel-
evant subjects with the sensitive preferences. The feature
similarity makes it difficult for an attacker to identify the
genuine user preference profile, even if the attacker captures
all the preference profiles. The subject irrelevance results in
that the exposure degree of the sensitive preferences on the
server-side can be effectively reduced by the fake profiles,
thereby, ensuring the security of users’ sensitive preferences.
Finally, according to the system framework and the pri-
vacy model mentioned above, based on a subject repository
of product classification, we present an implementation
algorithm that runs on a trusted client. The algorithm can
well meet the requirements of user privacy protection in
personalized recommendation, i.e., it can construct a group
of fake preference profiles that well meet the privacy model.
In addition, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of the
privacy model and its implementation algorithm through
theoretical analysis and experimental evaluation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
briefly reviews the related work. Section 3 presents a sys-
tem framework for user privacy protection in personalized
recommendation, as well as a related attack model. Section
4 formulates a privacy model on the protection of user
sensitive preferences, presents an implementation algorithm
to well meet the privacy model, and theoretically analyzes
the effectiveness of the proposed approach. Section 5 exper-
imentally evaluates the approach. Finally, we conclude this
paper in Section 6.
2 RELATED WORKS
Depending on the recommendation algorithms, recommen-
dation systems can be divided into three main categories:
(1) collaborative filtering [?], [?], [?], which is the process
of filtering products based on the similarity computation
of users’ previous preference products; (2) content-based
recommendation [?], [?], which recommends products for
a user based on the similarity between the user preferences
and the product descriptions; and (3) social network-based
recommendation [?], [?], which is an extension of collabo-
rative filtering, and measures the similarity of users using
a social network analysis technique. In general, a recom-
mendation algorithm has to run on an untrusted server-
side, and the better the recommendation accuracy, the more
users’ personal information the algorithm needs to master,
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consequently, leading to users’ serious concerns on personal
privacy [?], [?].
In order to protect user privacy in personalized recom-
mendation, many approaches have been proposed. In this
section, we briefly review and analyze these approaches,
specifically, including: data obfuscation, data transforma-
tion, anonymization etc.
2.1 Data Obfuscation
The basic idea of data obfuscation techniques is to leverage
fake data or general data to obfuscate the data related to the
sensitive preferences contained in user preference profiles.
In order to protect the genuine intention hidden in a user
query, the paper [?] proposes to inject the false keywords
into the user query. Then, similar approaches are also pro-
posed in the literature [?], [?], but they allow a user to define
his own privacy requirements, i.e., to define the subjects
that the user wants to protect, and the degree of protection.
Aiming at personalized advertisement recommendation, the
paper [?] presents a client-based approach to user privacy
protection, which is based on the comprehensive consid-
eration of user privacy (i.e., the privacy level that a user
is willing to share with the server-side) and network traffic
(i.e., the number of ads returned to a mobile phone) to select
relevant ads for a user. Aiming at personalized web search,
the paper [?] designs a user preference protection approach.
It builds a hierarchical structure of user preferences on the
client, where nodes of high level are used to store general
preference subjects, while other nodes of low level are
used to store special subjects. Then, some general subjects
are selected to replace sensitive special subjects, so as to
protect the user sensitive preferences. Afterwards, similar
approaches are presented in [?], [?], which also propose to
cover up the user interested preferences using more general
preferences. However, this kind of techniques certainly will
reduce the recommendation accuracy due to its change to
user preference profiles, namely, whose privacy protection
is based on a compromise on recommendation performance.
2.2 Data Transformation
In data transformation techniques, users’ personal data need
to be transformed (e.g., by noise addition or data pertur-
bation) [?], [?], [?], before being used for personalized rec-
ommendation. Generally, this kind of techniques can only
be applied to collaborative filtering algorithms. Random
perturbation technique (RPT) is a frequently-used approach
for data transformation [?], [?]. Its basic idea is to attach
a random data (r) to the user sensitive data (a) so that
what an attacker can see is (a + r), i.e., submit the user
sensitive data together with the additional random data to
the server for personalized recommendation, so that the
server cannot see the true user data. When the user data
quantity is large enough, by using the overall user data for
collaborative filtering recommendation, we can still obtain
a relatively accurate recommendation result. Thus, RPT can
ensure not only the security of user privacy, but also the
recommendation accuracy. A similar method is proposed
in [19] to protect the personal privacy of data mining. The
paper [?] designs a collaborative filtering recommendation
system based on the discrete wavelet transform (DWT) tech-
nique and random perturbation technique. The paper [?]
proposes to write several well-designed “predictive scores”
into a user-product scoring matrix (that is the input of a col-
laborative filtering algorithm), so as to perturb the true user
scoring information and thus protect personal privacy. The
paper [?] has evaluated the effect of data transformation on
the accuracy of collaborative filtering recommendation. The
results show that effective data transformation would not
lead to a negative impact on the accuracy of collaborative
filtering recommendation.
It can be seen that this kind of techniques can ensure not
only the accuracy of recommendation results to a certain
extent, but also the security of a sensitive preference in its
user preference profile effectively. However, the accuracy
of a recommendation result leads to that many products
relevant to the user sensitive preferences are generally con-
tained in the recommendation result. Since the recommen-
dation result is fully visible to the untrusted server-side,
it is possible for an attacker on the server-side to guess
the genuine user preferences conversely through analyzing
the recommendation result, consequently, leading to the
disclosure of personal privacy.
2.3 Anonymization
Anonymization is a kind of widely used approaches in
privacy protection. It allows users to use a system without
the need to expose their identity information. Anonymiza-
tion, due to the non-complexity of its processing, can be
easily applied to a personalized recommendation system,
and has been widely used in many systems to protect user
personal privacy, such as [?], [?], [?] and [?]. However,
there have been many questions about the practicality of
using anonymization for privacy protection in personalized
recommendation. The papers [?], [?] present the shortages of
anonymization to user privacy protection, and demonstrate
the results by using experiment evaluations. Anonymization
increases the possibility that a user submits useless random
data, thereby, decreasing the quality of user personal data.
Moreover, anonymization also makes the system easier to
be attacked by competitors. For example, a company can
submit a large number of fake data in a recommenda-
tion system to promote its own products to obtain more
opportunities of recommendation. Thus, it is necessary to
confirm the true identity for each user in a recommendation
system. At present, most of personalized recommendation
systems require users to provide the basic information that
can identify their personal identities. Therefore, this kind of
techniques cannot satisfy the requirement of the practical
application of personalized recommendation.
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this paper, we study an approach for protecting user sen-
sitive subjects in a personalized recommendation system.
According to the motivations presented in Section 1.1, the
approach has to meet the following four requirements. (1) It
does not change the existing structure of a recommendation
algorithm. (2) It does not compromise the accuracy of the
final recommendation. (3) It ensures the security of user
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Fig. 1. The system framework for the protection of user sensitive preferences in a personalized recommendation service, where the blue components
“sensitive preference protection” and “result reselection” are introduced newly.
preferences, making it difficult for an attacker not only
to identify the sensitive subjects from a user preference
profile, but also to guess the sensitive subjects conversely
from the recommendation result. (4) It does not lead to a
serious effect on the execution efficiency of a personalized
recommendation service. In this section, we present the
system model used in our approach, and then discuss the
attack model based on the system model.
3.1 System Model
Here, user sensitive preferences are referred as the personal
preferences that users are unwilling to be seen or analyzed
by attackers. Fig. 1 shows the system framework used by
this paper for the protection of user sensitive preferences in
a personalized recommendation service, which consists of
an untrusted server-side and many trusted client-sides. The
basic process flow of the system framework is presented as
follows.
• Under the client-based architecture, the user behav-
ior record component and the preference analysis
component are moved from the server to a client.
Thus, the client (instead of the server) collects and
analyzes user behaviors to generate a user preference
profile P∗.
• In the client, the newly-introduced component of
sensitive preference protection constructs a group
of fake preference profiles P∗1 ,P∗2 , ...,P∗n based on
the user preference profile P∗, after taking into
consideration the requirements of security, accuracy
and efficiency. Then, the fake preference profiles are
submitted together with the genuine user preference
profile to the server-side, as the input of the person-
alized recommendation algorithm.
• In the client, the newly-introduced result reselec-
tion component selects the recommendation re-
sult R∗, which corresponds to the user preference
profile P∗, from all the recommendation results
R∗,R∗1,R∗2, ...,R∗n that are returned by the recom-
mendation algorithm on the server-side. Then, the
component returns R∗ to the user, while discarding
the other recommendation results R∗1,R∗2, ...,R∗n.
Based on the system framework in Fig. 1, we conclude
as follows. On the one hand, the results outputted by the
recommendation algorithm component in the server-side,
are no longer equal to the true user recommendation result
(i.e., the result before the introduction of privacy protection).
They contain the recommendation results corresponding to
the fake preference profiles. Thus, it is difficult to immedi-
ately identify the user sensitive preferences from the recom-
mendation results. On the other hand, the results outputted
by the recommendation algorithm are certainly a superset of
the true recommendation result, thereby ensuring that the
user can obtain an accurate recommendation. In addition,
the system framework requires no change to the existing
personalized recommendation algorithm, so it is transparent
for both the user on the client and the recommendation
algorithm component running on the server-side.
However, from Fig. 1, it can also be seen that the fake
preference profiles generated by the component of sensitive
preference protection play an important role in the frame-
work, i.e., their quality is the key to user privacy protection.
Generally, the fake preference profiles generated randomly
are easy to be ruled out, thus failed to cover up the sensitive
preferences contained in a user preference profile. This is be-
cause the features of user preferences are generally regularly
distributed (e.g., a user is interested in one or several fixed
subjects for a period of time), while randomly generated
preference profiles are not (which may be evenly related
to a large number of subjects). Thus, an attacker can easily
detect fake preference profiles according to their different
feature distribution. In addition, the fake preference profiles
should be not related to the user sensitive preferences. For
example, suppose that a sensitive preference related to a
user preference profile is the subject “sporting goods”. Then,
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it is not appropriate to generate a group of fake profiles that
also contain the sensitive subject “sporting goods” or other
highly relevant subjects, because at this time, an attacker can
immediately draw a conclusion that the user is interested in
“sporting goods”, without ruling out the fake profiles. To
this end, fake preference profiles generated by the sensitive
preference protection component should meet the following
two requirements: (1) ensuring the security of user sensitive
preferences on the untrusted server-side, i.e., reducing the
exposure degree of user sensitive preferences on the server-
side, and hence the probability of an attacker to detect them;
and (2) exhibiting highly-similar feature distribution with
the user preference profile, so as to make it difficult for an
attacker to rule out the fake profiles, thus, hiding the user
profile effectively.
3.2 Attack Model
In the system framework, the server-side is not trusted,
which is considered as the biggest potential attacker. As-
sume that the attacker has taken control of the server (i.e.,
the attacker may be a hacker who breaks the server, or an
administrator who works on the server). Thus, the proposed
approach to user privacy protection needs to prevent the
server from identifying the sensitive preferences related
to a user preference profile. From the system framework
shown in Fig. 1, we can see that the attacker can obtain
not only all the preference profiles submitted by the client,
but also all the recommendation results generated by the
personalized recommendation algorithm. Thus, we need
to prevent the attacker from identifying the user sensitive
preferences not only from the preference profiles, but also
from the recommendation results. In addition, because of
taking control of the server, the attacker has a powerful
capability, which masters the database of all the products
and the repository of product classification, and takes charge
of executing the personalized recommendation algorithm.
Unfortunately, the attacker might also know the existence of
the sensitive preference protection algorithm deployed on
the client, and obtain a copy of the algorithm. Hence, the
attacker can input each of the mastered preference profiles
to the privacy protection algorithm, and then observe the
output results to guess the user preference profile.
4 PROPOSED APPROACH
Based on the system model and the attack model presented
in Section 3, in this section, we propose our approach so
as to protect the user sensitive preferences. First, based
on the system model, we define a privacy model, which
formulates the requirements that the fake preference profiles
should satisfy so as to effectively protect the user sensitive
preferences. Second, based on a subject repository of prod-
uct classification, we describe an implementation algorithm
for the privacy model, to generate a group of fake profiles
that have similar feature distribution but irrelevant sensitive
subjects with the user preference profile. Finally, we analyze
the security of our proposed approach, and compare our
approach with other state-of-art ones in terms of security,
efficiency, usability and accuracy. In Table 1, we describe
key symbols used in this paper.
TABLE 1
Symbols and their meanings
Symbols Meanings
P A set of all the products
P∗ A set of user preference products, i.e., P∗ ⊆ P
G A set of all the subjects
G∗ A set of user preference subjects, i.e., G∗ ⊆ G
G∗k
A set of user preference subjects with the level
k, i.e., G∗k ⊆ G∗
G† A set of user sensitive preference subjects, i.e.,G† ⊆ G∗
km
The maximum of levels for all the subjects, i.e.,
km = maxg∈G{level(g)}
P
The product feature distribution vector, which
corresponds to P∗
Gk
The subject feature distribution vector, which
corresponds to G∗k
4.1 Privacy Model
Below, based on the system architecture shown in Fig. 1,
we define a privacy model for user sensitive preference
protection. As seen from Fig. 1, a user preference profile is
an important data structure, which is not only the output
of the preference analysis component, but also the input
of the sensitive preference protection component and the
recommendation algorithm component. The organization
structure of a user preference profile is mainly restricted
by the recommendation algorithm, i.e., recommendation
algorithms of different types will lead to different profile
structures. In this paper, we aim to study widely-used
collaborative filtering algorithms (whose input is a user
product preference scoring matrix) [?]. To this end, a user
preference profile can be viewed as a set of user preference
products, where each product has been scored by a user
(the higher preference score a product has, the more the
user is interested in), i.e., we can define a user preference
product set to represent a user preference profile.
Definition 1 (Preference Product Set). A user preference
product set is a set of all the products that a user is interested
in. It can be formulated as P∗ = { p | p ∈ P ∧ score(p) ̸= 0},
wherein, P denotes a set of all the products; and score(p)
denotes the preference score presented by the user for the
product p.
It can be seen that a preference product set is composed
of the products whose scores are not equal to zero. Actually,
it is easy to obtain the preference product set for a user,
based on the scoring values of all the products calculated by
the behavior record component and the preference analysis
component. In the background database of products of
a personalized recommendation system, there is a tree
structure organized based on the levels of subjects, so as to
manage the products. For example, the product “Lenovo
K2450” step-by-step belongs to the subjects “Lenovo”,
“notebook computer”, “computer” and “IT and digit”. A
sample of a subject tree is shown in Fig. 2, where each
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Fig. 2. A sample of a subject tree, where the blue nodes represent products, and the others represent subjects.
represents a subject. Thus, with the help of a subject tree,
we can further compute the preference score of the user
to each subject, based on the preference scores of all the
products.
Definition 2 (Subject Score). A user subject score, which
denotes the preference degree of the user to a subject g (g ∈
G), can be represented as score(g), where G denotes a set of
all the subjects. The subject score can be computed based on
the user preference scores for all the products, i.e., it can be












wherein, P(g) denotes all the products that directly belong
to the subject g; G(g) denotes all the sub-subjects that
directly belong to the subject g; and the parameters ρp and
ρg denote a product attenuation coefficient and a subject
attenuation coefficient, respectively.
Below, we take the subject tree in Fig. 2 as an example
to show how the subject score is calculated. To simplify
the presentation, we set ρp = ρg = 2, and assume that
score(“55M5”) = score(“50S9”) = 1 and the scores of the
rest products are all equal to 0. Based on Definition 2, we
have that score(“Skyworth”) = 1 (where G(“Skyworth”) =
⊘) and score(“FPTV”) = 0.5 (where P(“FPTV”) = ⊘).
Further, we have that score(“Large Appliances”) = 0.25
and score(“Appliances”) = 0.125.
From Fig. 2, we observe that there are a number of
inclusion relations between subjects. For example, the
subject “Fridge” belongs to “Large Appliances”, and “Large
Appliances” belongs to “Appliances”. Thus, each product
subject is associated with a level. We stipulate that the
higher the level, the more special a subject (e.g., “Media”),
and the lower the level, the more general a subject (e.g.,
“Appliances”). Below, we use level(g) to denote the level
of a subject g ∈ G, and km to denote the maximum subject
level, i.e., km = maxg∈G {level(g)}.
Definition 3 (Preference Subject Set). A user preference
subject set is a set of all the subjects that a user is interested
in. It is formulated as G∗ = {g | g ∈ G ∧ score(g) ≥ τg},
where G denotes a set of all the subjects, and τg denotes a
preset threshold.
A preference subject set is composed of all the products
whose preference scores are greater than the threshold τg
(the subjects whose scores are less than the threshold, are
considered as meaningless). It can be seen that a preference
subject set G∗ has to be constructed based on a preference
product set P∗, i.e., G∗ corresponds to P∗.
Definition 4 (Preference Subject Set with a Level). A
user preference subject set with the level k consists of all
the subjects whose levels are equal to k in the preference
subject set G∗ (0 < k ≤ km). Formally, it can be formulated
as G∗k = {g | g ∈ G∗ ∧ level(g) = k}.
Obviously, we have G∗ =
∪km
k=1 G∗k , so based on a
preference product set P∗, we can obtain a group of
preference subject sets of different levels, i.e., G∗1 ,G∗2 , ...,G∗km .
Now, we can use a subject to indicate a user sensitive
preference, called a user sensitive subject (denoted by g†).
A user sensitive subject g† indicates a subject of products
that a user is unwilling to be known by an attacker, which
can be assigned by the user in advance. Given a preference
product set P∗, based on Definition 3, we can obtain a
preference subject set G∗. Then, using G∗ as an intermediate
reference, we can further compute the degree of exposure
of a user sensitive subject g† in a user preference product
set P∗ (i.e., a user preference profile). Below, we define
the significance to represent the exposure degree of a user
sensitive subject.
Definition 5 (Sensitive Subject Significance). Given any
sensitive subject g† and a user preference product set P∗, let
k be the level of the subject g† (i.e., k = level(g†)), and G∗k be
a preference subject set with the level k, which is obtained
based on the set P∗. Then, the significance of the sensitive







Given several preference product sets P = {P∗1 ,P∗2 , ...,P∗n},
let G∗ik be a user preference subject set with the level k, which
is obtained based on the set P∗i ∈ P. Then, the significance
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of the sensitive subject g† in these preference product sets








How to effectively protect each sensitive subject related
to the product set P∗ is the key to user privacy protection.
According to the system model and the attack model men-
tioned in Section 3, when an attacker does not know the
user sensitive subjects, he/she can only guess by analyzing
the preference product sets P∗,P∗1 ,P∗2 , ...,P∗n submitted
from a client-side. Obviously, given a sensitive subject, the
greater its significance in the preference product sets, the
more likely the attacker guesses it. To this end, we can
use the significance of each sensitive subject to measure the
exposure risk of user personal privacy.
According to Definition 5, the sensitive preference
protection component can construct fake preference
product sets P∗1 ,P∗2 , ...,P∗n for the user preference product
set P∗, so as to decrease the significance of each user
sensitive subject related to P∗, and hence the probability of
exposing the sensitive subjects. However, the precondition
of the above idea is that the features of the fake preference
product sets have to be highly similar to that of the genuine
user preference product set, so as to make them difficult to
be ruled out by an attacker. To this end, we below define
the feature distribution of a preference product set.
Definition 6 (Product Feature Distribution). Given a
preference product set P∗, its feature distribution can be
described using the following vector:
P = (score(p1), score(p2), ..., score(pn))
wherein, pi ∈ P∗ (i = 1, 2, ..., n), score(pi) ≤ score(pi+1)
(i = 1, 2, ..., n− 1), and n = |P∗|.
Definition 7 (Subject Feature Distribution). Given a
preference subject set G∗k with the level k, its feature dis-
tribution can be described using the following vector:
Gk = (score(g1), score(g2), ..., score(gn))
wherein, gi ∈ G∗k (i = 1, 2, ..., n), score(gi) ≤ score(gi+1)
(i = 1, 2, ..., n− 1), and n = |G∗k |.
Now, for any preference product set P∗, we can obtain
a product feature vector P , and a group of subject feature
vectors, G1, G2, ..., Gk
m
. Then, we can further define the
feature similarity between any two product sets, which is
measured by the similarity of the product feature vectors
of the two product sets, and the similarities of the subject
feature vectors.
Definition 8 (Feature Similarity). The feature similarity
between two product sets can be measured by the similarity
of the product feature vectors of the two product sets, and
the similarities of the subject feature vectors. Given any
two preference product sets P∗1 and P∗2 , we use P1 and
P2 to denote their product feature vectors, and Gk1 and
Gk2 to denote their subject feature vectors with the level k
(k = 1, 2, ..., km). Then, the feature similarity between P∗1
and P∗2 is measured as follows (where dist denotes the Euler
distance between two vectors):


















In the above formula, the parameters (a0, a1, ..., akm )
are used to balance different kinds of similarities of feature
vectors. In the subsequent experiments, we will simply set
them to 1(km+1) uniformly. It should be pointed out that
the feature vectors P1 and P2 (or Gk1 and G
k
2) may be not
of the same dimensionality. At this time, we will fill the
feature vector of smaller size with zeros, so as to calculate
the similarity between them. Now, based on Definition
5 (i.e., sensitive preference significance) and Definition
8 (i.e., feature distribution similarity), we can further
formulate the requirements that the fake preference product
sets generated by the component of sensitive preference
protection have to satisfy, so as to prevent an attacker from
guessing the user sensitive subjects.
Definition 9 (Sensitive Subject Protection). Given a
user preference product set P∗, a group of user sensitive
subjects G†, and a group of fake preference product sets
P∗1 ,P∗2 , ...,P∗n, if the fake product sets meet the following
two requirements, then it is deemed that they can be used
to effectively protect the sensitive subjects G†.
• Ensuring the security of the sensitive subject: based
on the fake preference product sets, the significance
of each sensitive subject g† ∈ G† can be effectively
decreased, i.e.,
∀g† ∈ G† →
sig
(




wherein, 0 < µp < 1. This condition ensures the
exposure degree (i.e., the significance) of each sensi-
tive subject in the preference product sets can be de-
creased effectively, consequently, making it difficult
for an attacker to discover the sensitive subjects.
• Ensuring the similarity of the feature distribution:
the feature of each fake preference product set should
be similar to that of the user preference product set,
i.e.,
∀P∗i ∈ {P∗1 ,P∗2 , ...,P∗n} → sim(P∗,P∗i ) ≥ µo
wherein, 0 < µo < 1. This condition makes it
difficult for an attacker to rule out the fake prefer-
ence product sets, thereby, hiding the genuine user
preference product set effectively.
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Fig. 3. The two preprocessing ways for a subject tree, where the left
denotes a splitting operation, and the right denotes a merging operation.
Now, our objective is to design and implement an ef-
fective algorithm for the component of sensitive preference
protection, so as to construct a group of fake preference
product sets that well satisfy the requirements presented in
Definition 9.
4.2 Implementation Algorithm
Below, we present an implementation algorithm for the
privacy model mentioned above. The preference analysis
component calculates the preference score for each product
by analyzing user online behaviors, and constructs a pref-
erence product set. Then, based on the score of the user to
each product, the sensitive preference protection component
calculates the preference score of the user to each subject
(i.e., Definition 2), with the help of a hierarchical subject
tree. As a result, we can further compute the significance
of each sensitive subject (i.e., Definition 5) and the feature
distribution similarity (i.e., Definition 8). Therefore, in the
privacy model, the subject tree is a very important data
structure. A subject tree has the following characteristics:
(1) each leaf node represents a product; (2) each non-leaf
node represents a subject; (3) each product is contained in a
subject; and (4) each subject is contained in another subject
(except for the root subject). In the background product
database of a personalized recommendation system, there
generally exists a hierarchical subject tree similar to that
shown in Fig. 2; even if not, it can be constructed with the
help of external product subject classification knowledge
base, such as Wikipedia [?], ODP [?] and WordNet [?].
Therefore, we can assume that the hierarchical subject tree is
pre-existent in the algorithm implementation of the privacy
model. However, the depths of leaf nodes of the subject tree
may be different from each other, but we note that such
difference is very small. Thus, to make all the leaf nodes of
a hierarchical subject tree with the same depth (i.e., all equal
to km + 1) so as to facilitate the algorithm implementation,
we can preprocess the subject tree by using the following
two ways: (1) splitting some leaf nodes of smaller depth, and
constructing their parent node; and (2) merging some leaf
nodes of bigger depth, and deleting their parent node. Fig.
3 illustrates the above two preprocessing ways. In addition,
we also load the classification subject tree into the memory
in advance, so as to improve the running efficiency of the
algorithm.
Algorithm 1 details the implementation of our approach
to sensitive subject protection. Generally, the number of the
user sensitive subjects and the number of the user preference
subjects are both small (i.e., |G†| ≪ |G| and |G∗| ≪ |G|), thus
in Line 13 of Algorithm 1, we assume that |A∗| ≤ |A|, so as
to simplify the presentation of the algorithm. In the WHILE
loop (Lines 6-9) of Algorithm 1, a procedure call operation
(i.e., “SearchFakeProducts” at Line 8) would obtain a fake
product set P∗i . Thus, after the WHILE loop, a group of fake
product sets P would be generated, based on which, the
significance of the user sensitive subjects (see the WHILE
condition) can be decreased effectively. In the procedure
“SearchFakeProducts”, the parameter k is used to denote
the level of the currently processed user subjects in A∗. If
k = km (i.e., A∗ ⊆ G∗km ), it indicates that the child nodes
of each subject in A∗ are leaf nodes that denote products.
At this time, from P , we randomly search a group of fake
products that have the same product feature distribution
with the user products belonging to A∗ (Lines 20-23). If
k < km, it indicates that the child nodes of each subject in
A∗ are non-leaf nodes that denote subjects. At this time, we
search a group of fake subjects that have the same subject
feature distribution with the user subjects (Line 17), and
then, recursively call the procedure “SearchFakeProducts”
to process the user subjects at the next level (k+1) (Line 18).
Finally, this results in that each fake product set constructed
by “SearchFakeProducts” has highly similar overall feature
distribution with the user product set.
In Algorithm 1, although there exists a recursive call for
the procedure “SearchFakeProducts” (Line 8), the execution
number of the recursive operations at the bottom level
(Lines 21-23) for constructing fake products is equal to the
size of the user product set, i.e., equal to |P∗|; and the
execution number of the other recursive operations (Line
17) for constructing fake subjects is equal to the size of the
user subject set, i.e., equal to |G∗|. In addition, since the fake
product sets are irrelevant to the user sensitive subjects (see
Line 4), the execution number of the WHILE loops should
be approximately equal to ⌊ 1µp ⌋, i.e., the number of fake
product sets constructed by Algorithm 1 is approximately
equal to ⌊ 1µp ⌋. Thus, the time complexity of Algorithm 1
is equal to O
(
⌊ 1µp ⌋ · (|P
∗|+ |G∗|)
)
, which is a relatively
ideal polynomial time complexity, and thus does not cause
a serious effect on the execution efficiency of a personalized
recommendation service.
In addition, since the number of fake product sets con-
structed by Algorithm 1 for a user preference product set is
approximately equal to ⌊ 1µp ⌋, in the next experiment section,
the number of fake product sets will be used as an input
parameter of Algorithm 1 (instead of µp), so as to simplify
the presentation for the experimental results.
4.3 Effectiveness Analysis
Based on the system model given in Section 3.1, it can be
seen that our proposed approach to user privacy protection
not only requires no change to an existing recommendation
algorithm, but also requires no compromise on the accuracy
of recommendation results. In the approach, the threshold
µp is used to control the significance of the sensitive sub-
jects, and the smaller the threshold value is, the lower the
risk of the sensitive subjects are exposed. In addition, a
personalized recommendation service would input (n + 1)
preference product sets, and output (n+1) recommendation
results (where n ≈ ⌊ 1µp ⌋). Thus, if we ignore the running
time of the sensitive preference protection algorithm itself
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Algorithm 1: Protecting the User Sensitive Preferences
Input: (1) P∗, a user preference product set (i.e., a user preference profile); (2) G†, the user sensitive subjects (i.e., the
sensitive preferences); and (3) related parameters (e.g., µp).
Output: P∗1 ,P∗2 , ...,P∗n, a group of fake product sets (i.e., fake preference profiles).
1 begin
2 From a set of all the subjects G, select the subject sets with the levels 1, 2, ..., km (km denotes the maximum of subject
levels), respectively, denoted by G1,G2, ...,Gk
m
, i.e., ∀g ∈ Gk → level(g) = k (k = 1, 2, ..., km);
3 From a set of all the user preference subjects G∗, select the subject sets with the levels 1, 2, ..., km, respectively, denoted
by G∗1 ,G∗2 , ...,G∗km ;
4 foreach Gk ∈ {G1,G2, ...,Gk
m
} do set Gk = Gk − G† ; // Remove all the sensitive subjects from Gk
5 set P = ⊘ ; // P is used to store the generated fake product sets
6 while ∃g† ∈ G† → µp · sig(g†,P∗) < sig(g†, {P∗} ∪P) do
7 set P∗i = ⊘ ; // Set an empty fake product set
8 call SearchFakeProducts(G1, G∗1 , 1, P∗i );
9 set P = P ∪ {P∗i } ; // Generate a fake product set
10 return P ; // Output all the generated fake product sets
11 Procedure SearchFakeProducts(A in, A∗ in, k in, P∗i in & out) // k denotes the level of the subjects in A
12 begin
13 Select |A∗| subjects from A randomly to form a fake subject set A# ; // Here, we assume that |A∗| ≤ |A|
14 Pair the subjects in A∗ and A# randomly (below, we assume g∗ ∈ A∗ paired with g# ∈ A#);
15 if k < km then // If the current subject level is not the highest
16 foreach g∗ ∈ A∗ do
17 Let B∗ be all the subjects in G∗k+1 that belong to g∗, and B# be all the subjects in Gk+1 that belong to g#;
18 call SearchFakeProducts(B#, B∗, k + 1, P∗i ) ; // A recursive procedure call
19 else // If the current level is the highest, i.e., the child nodes are products
20 foreach g∗ ∈ A∗ do
21 Let B∗ be all the products in P∗ that belong to g∗, and B# be all the products in P that belong to g#;
22 foreach p ∈ B∗ do Select a fake product p′ randomly from B#, and set score(p′) = score(p) Add all the scored
fake products from B# into the fake product set P∗i ; // P∗i is an output parameter
on the client-side, the running time of a personalized recom-
mendation service will be increased to (n + 1) times, after
the introduction of the preference protection algorithm. As
a result, the decrease degree of the running performance
of personalized recommendation caused by our approach
has a linear positive correlation with the level of user
privacy protection, i.e., the approach has little impact on
the running performance of personalized recommendation.
Next, we analyze the security of our approach. We assume
that an attacker on the server-side has mastered the w-
hole database of products and the hierarchical subject tree,
and obtained a copy of the sensitive preference protection
algorithm. What can the attacker deduce about the user
sensitive subjects G†, according to the preference product
sets P = {P∗,P∗1 ,P∗2 , ...,P∗n}? Here, we take the following
three cases into consideration.
(1) Under the precondition of not identifying out the
genuine user preference product set P∗ from P, can the
attacker guess the sensitive subjects G† immediately? At this
time, since the attacker does not know which one in P is
the genuine product set, he/she can only first obtain all the
subjects related to each product set in P (calculated based
on Definition 3), and then guess which ones are the user
sensitive subjects. Since the significance of each sensitive
subject g† ∈ G† has been reduced greatly in P (see the
experimental results in Section 5), the possibility of guessing
g† would become small. Therefore, it is difficult for the
attacker to guess the sensitive subjects G†, if not finding out
the user preference product set P∗ in advance.
(2) Can the attacker find out the genuine user preference
product set P∗ from P? At this time, the attacker can only
analyze the features of all the product sets in P to guess
which one is the user preference product set. Because the
fake product sets constructed by our approach are of the
same product feature distribution with the user product
set, it is difficult for the attacker to distinguish the genuine
product set according to the product feature distribution.
In addition, the hierarchical subject tree related to the back-
ground database of products is visible to the attacker, so
the attacker can obtain all the subject sets related to each
product set in P. However, since these subject sets also
have identical feature distribution to each other (see the
experimental results in Section 5), it is also difficult for the
attacker to distinguish the genuine product set according to
the subject feature distribution.
(3) Under the precondition of obtaining a copy of the
sensitive preference protection algorithm (i.e., Algorithm 1),
can the attacker guess the user preference product set P∗?
At this time, the attacker can in turn input each product set
P∗i ∈ P, and then test whether the sensitive preference pro-
tection algorithm outputs the other product sets P \ {P∗i }.
If successfully, then it indicates that P∗i is the user product
set. However, such an attempt will not succeed, because all
the fake products and their subjects are randomly selected
(see Lines 13 and 22 in Algorithm 1), i.e., the same input will
lead to different output.
In summary, it is difficult for the attacker to identify
the user sensitive preferences (the sensitive subjects) from
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TABLE 2
The comparison of effectiveness, where the security 1 denotes the security of the sensitive subjects in preference profiles, and the security 2
denotes the security of the sensitive subjects in recommendation results
Candidates Our approach Anonymization Data obfuscation Data transformation
Security 1 Good Good Good Good
Security 2 Good Good Not Good Not Good
Accuracy Good Good Not Good Not Good
Usability Good Not Good Good Good
Efficiency Not Good Not Good Good Good
a preference profile submitted by a user from a client-side.
For the same reason, although the recommendation result
R∗ contains the products corresponding to the user sensitive
preferences, the attacker cannot from {R∗,R∗1,R∗2, ...,R∗n}
guess which one is the recommendation result R∗ corre-
sponding to the user preference product set P∗, so also can-
not further deduce reversely the user sensitive preferences
based on R∗. In short, our approach to user sensitive pref-
erence protection can ensure the security of user sensitivity
preferences effectively, i.e., it is difficult for an attacker to
identify the user sensitive preferences not only from the in-
put of the recommendation algorithm (i.e., from preference
profiles), but also from the output of the recommendation
algorithm (i.e., from recommendation results).
In addition, from the related work presented in Section 2,
we see that: (1) sensitive data obfuscation cannot ensure the
accuracy of personalized recommendation results; (2) data
transformation cannot ensure the security of user personal
privacy, i.e., an attacker can guess the user sensitive pref-
erences reversely according to recommendation results; and
(3) anonymization requires to change the framework of an
existing personalized recommendation system, resulting in
a poor usability. Table 2 shows the effectiveness comparison
of our approach to the state-of-the-art ones, where: (1)
the security is “good”, if and only if the related security
problem has been considered by the approach, and a good
solution has been proposed; (2) the accuracy is “good”, if
and only if the recommendation result is the same before
and after the approach is introduced; (3) the usability is
“good”, if and only if the approach is transparent for both
the user and the recommendation algorithm; and (4) the
efficiency is “good”, if and only if the recommendation
efficiency is the same before and after the approach is intro-
duced, if we ignore the running efficiency of the approach
itself. From Table 2, we observe that our proposed approach
obtains better comprehensive performance than the others
in terms of security, accuracy, usability and efficiency.
5 EXPERIMENT EVALUATION
From the effectiveness analysis in Section 4.3, it can be seen
that the effectiveness of our approach on user sensitive sub-
ject protection is dependent on the generated fake product
sets, i.e., dependent on whether the fake product sets can
effectively reduce the significance of the sensitive subjects,
and have highly similar feature distribution with the user
product set (so as to hide the user preference profile). In
this section, we will evaluate the effectiveness of the fake
product sets by experiments. First, we describe the experi-
mental setup. Second, we present the experimental results
in terms of the sensitive subject significance and the feature
distribution similarity. Finally, the additional time and space
overheads caused by our approach are also analyzed.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Before the experiments, we briefly describe the experimen-
tal setup, including the reference dataset, the construction
of user preference product sets, algorithm candidates and
system resource configuration.
(1) Reference dataset: The data used in the experiments
are mainly collected from Jingdong1, which is one of the
most famous e-commerce platforms. First, we obtain all the
subjects at the foremost three levels of the Jingdong product
classification structure2. Second, we use a webpage program
to automatically open each subject at the level 3, thereby,
obtaining all the subjects at the level 4 (in Jingdong, the
subjects at the level 4 are the highest among all the subjects,
which correspond to various product brands). Third, we
use a webpage program to further open each subject at the
level 4, to obtain all the products (here, we only obtain the
top 10 products for each subject). Finally, a classification
subject tree (including a root node and a large number
of leaf nodes representing products) is constructed, which
consists of 20,751 subjects and 198,410 products. In addition,
we also optimize the subject tree in advance (e.g., sort
all the products and all the subjects at the same level),
consequently, enabling Algorithm 1 to access subjects and
products efficiently (Lines 13 and 22).
(2) Preference product sets: Based on the classification
subject tree, we construct a group of user preference product
sets randomly, in which the number of products in each
product set, the number of the preference subjects related
to each product set, the level of each preference subject,
the number of sensitive subjects related to each product set,
and the level of each sensitive subject, are all experimental
parameters, i.e., they can be adjusted dynamically. In the
experiments, by adjusting these parameters, we construct a
large number of user preference product sets with different
feature distributions, used as the input of each algorithm
candidate. In addition, we simply set the threshold τg of
Definition 3 to be 0 in our experiments.
(3) Algorithm candidates: We benchmark our approach
(called Privacy below) against the random approach (called
Random, where the products in each fake set are randomly
1. Jingdong – http://www.jd.com
2. All the subjects in Jingdong – http://www.jd.com/allSort.aspx
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selected from the product database, the preference scores
of the fake products are also randomly set, but the size of
a fake product set is equal to the size of a genuine user
product set). Here, Random is only used as the baseline
approach. In the experiments, we do not compare against
other algorithms mentioned in the related work section,
since these algorithms are proposed under different system
frameworks or privacy models, and are not comparable to
our approach. Instead, we have analyzed the advantages
and disadvantages of these algorithms in Section 4.3.
(4) System resource configuration: In our experiments,
all the algorithms are implemented by using the Java pro-
gramming language. The experiments are performed on a
Java Virtual Machine (version 1.7.0 07) with an Intel i7-
5500U CPU and 2 GB of maximum working memory.
5.2 Feature Distribution Similarity
In the first group of experiments, we aim to evaluate the fea-
ture distribution similarity between genuine user product
sets and fake product sets produced by our approach. Here,
we use the metric “feature distribution similarity”, which is
developed based on Definition 8, and used to measure the
effectiveness of fake profiles to hide genuine user profiles.
Given an algorithm candidate AC (i.e., it may be Privacy or
Random) and a user product set P∗, let P denote a group
of fake product sets generated by AC for P∗, Pi denote the
product vector of P∗i ∈ P, and Gki denote the subject vector
with the level k (k = 1, 2, ..., km) for P∗i . Then, the similarity
metric for the candidate AC can be formulated as
ProductSim(AC) = min
P∗i ∈P
{sim(Pi, P )} (5)
SubjectSimk(AC) = minP∗i ∈P









A higher value is better, because it means that the fake
product sets have more similar feature distribution as the
user product set, consequently, making it difficult for an
attacker to identify the user product set from P ∪ {P∗}.
In the experiments, the number of products contained in
each user product set (i.e., the size of P∗) is set to 200-1000,
and the level of each preference subject is set to 1-4, and the
number of preference subjects (i.e., the size of G∗) is set to
85 (where |G∗1 | = 1, |G∗2 | = 4, |G∗3 | = 16, |G∗4 | = 64). The
experiment results are shown in Fig. 4, where the value of
each point is from the average of 10 running results. In Fig.
4, the caption of each subfigure denotes the feature similari-
ty metric used in the experiment (ProductSim, SubjectSimk
or OverallSim). In addition, the X axis denotes the number
of product in each user product set, i.e., the size of P∗; the
Y axis denotes the feature similarity between user product
sets and the fake product sets produced by an algorithm
candidate; and Privacy [n] (n is equal to 2, 4 or 6) denotes the
number of fake product sets constructed using Privacy for
each user product set, and Random [n] denotes the number
of fake product sets constructed using Random.
From Fig. 4, it can be seen that, as expected, the fake
product sets constructed using Privacy exhibit a much better
feature distribution similarity (including the product simi-
larity, the subject similarity and the overall similarity), com-
pared to those constructed using Random. Specifically, the
similarity of the fake product sets from Privacy is close to
1.0, i.e., both have nearly the same feature distribution; and
the similarity almost remains unchanged, with the changing
of the number of fake product sets, and the number of
products in each fake product set. Moreover, the overall
similarity of the fake product sets from Random is less than
0.2, and obviously smaller than that from Privacy; and the
similarity is decreased with the increasing of the number of
fake product sets, and the number of products in each fake
product set.
Based on the above experimental analysis, we conclude
that the fake product sets produced by our approach have
a highly similar feature distribution with the genuine user
product sets, making it difficult for an attacker to rule out
the fake product sets based on the feature distribution, i.e.,
the genuine user product sets (the user preference profiles)
can be hidden effectively by using our approach.
5.3 Sensitive Subject Significance
In the second group of experiments, we aim to evaluate
the effectiveness of the fake product sets produced by our
approach to cover up the user sensitive subjects (i.e., the
significance of the sensitive subjects). Here, we use the
metric “sensitive subject significance”, which is used to
measure the exposure degree of a sensitive subject in the
fake product sets. Given an algorithm candidate AC and a
user product set P∗, we use P to denote a group of fake
product sets generated by AC for P∗, and G†k to denote the
sensitive subjects with the level k related to P∗. Then, based
on Definition 5, the significance metric for the candidate AC









A smaller value is better, because it means the better ef-
fectiveness of the fake product sets to cover up the sensitive
subjects, consequently, making it difficult for an attacker to
guess the sensitive subjects immediately from P ∪ {P∗}.
In the experiments, for each user product set, the levels
of its sensitive subjects are set to be the same value (which
may be 1, 2 or 3), and the number of its sensitive subjects
is set to 1 (when the level of the sensitive subjects is set to
1), 4 (when the level is 2) or 8 (when the level is 3). The
experimental results are shown in Fig. 5, where: the caption
of each subfigure denotes the number of user preference
subjects related to each user product set (i.e., G∗1 ,G∗2 ,G∗3 );
the X axis denotes the number of fake product sets produced
by an algorithm candidate; the Y axis denotes the sensitive
subject significance, i.e., the effectiveness of fake product
sets to cover up the sensitive subjects; and Privacy [n] (n is
equal to 1, 2 or 3) denotes the metric LevelSign(Privacy),
and Random [n] denotes LevelSign(Random). From Fig.
5, it can be seen that the fake product sets constructed
using Privacy can effectively reduce the significance of

























































































































































































(f) OverallSim, the overall feature similarity
Fig. 4. The experimental evaluation results for feature distribution similarity
almost linearly negatively related to the number of fake
product sets, independently of the number of products in
each fake product set and the level of the subjects. Moreover,
compared to our approach, the fake product sets constructed
using Random can also effectively reduce the significance of
the sensitive subjects, but their stability is relatively worse
(especially, when the level of the preference subjects is set
to 1, i.e., Random [1]). However, more importantly, based
on the first group of experiments, we know that the fake
product sets from Random exhibit a much worse feature
distribution similarity with the genuine user product sets,
consequently, making them easy to be ruled out by an
attacker, and in turn, failed to protect user sensitive subjects.
Based on the above experimental analysis, we conclude
that the fake product sets produced by our approach can
effectively reduce the significance of user sensitive subjects,
consequently, making it difficult for an attacker to guess the
sensitive subjects (the user sensitive preferences) immedi-
ately under the precondition of not finding out the genuine
user preference profiles.
5.4 Space and Time Overheads
Since we have in advance sorted all the subjects and prod-
ucts in the classification subject tree, the selection process
for fake subjects and fake products in Algorithm 1 becomes
very efficient. Moreover, the number of products contained
in a user preference product set is generally small (at the
level of hundreds of products). Therefore, our algorithm has
a good running performance. According to the experimental
results, our algorithm has almost the same running time
with the random algorithm, both less than 1 millisecond,
so such a time overhead is negligible. Thus, based on
the system framework shown in Fig. 1, we conclude that
after the introduction of the sensitive preference protection
mechanism, the additional time overhead of a personalized
recommendation service is mainly generated by the rec-
ommendation for the fake product sets, which is linearly
positively related to the number of fake product sets. As a
result, when the number of fake product sets is smaller, it
does not result in a bigger effect on the running efficiency.
In addition to the time overhead, there is also space
overhead. The extra space overhead of our algorithm is
mainly from the preload of the subject tree to the main
memory. In the subject tree, we only store the product
numbers without other product information, so the storage
space overhead is not high, especially, when the number of
products is not large. In the experiments, we used 20,751
subjects and 198,410 products, which only require several
megabytes of the space overhead (about 0.87 MB). In fact,
the number of all the products contained in the Jingdong
platform is up to ten millions; even so, we only need
hundreds of megabytes of space overhead to handle with
them. In extreme cases, if we need to deal with a very large
database of products (e.g., billions of products), we can use
the following strategy to reduce the space overhead: first, for
each subject at the highest level (i.e., the parent nodes of leaf
nodes), we randomly select a part of its products and load
them into the main memory (instead of all the products),
so as to reduce the space overhead; and then, at regular
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(d) The sensitive subject significance when
|G∗1 | = 1, |G∗2 | = 8 and |G∗3 | = 32
Fig. 5. The experimental evaluation results for sensitivity subject significance
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an approach for protecting
personal privacy for users when using a personalized rec-
ommendation service, whose basic idea is to construct a
group of fake preference profiles to cover up the sensitive
subjects contained in a user preference profile, and in turn
protect user personal privacy. We used a client-based system
framework that requires not only no change to the existing
recommendation algorithms, but also no compromise to the
accuracy of recommendation results. Finally, both theoreti-
cal analysis and experimental evaluation have demonstrat-
ed the effectiveness of our approach: (1) it can generate a
group of good-quality fake preference profiles, which not
only have high feature distribution similarities with the
genuine user preference profile (so as to hide the genuine
profile), but also can be used to effectively reduce the risk of
exposing the user sensitive subjects; and (2) it does not cause
serious performance overheads on either running time or
running memory. Therefore, we conclude that our approach
can be used to effectively protect users’ personal privacy in
personalized recommendation.
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